After Hobby Lobby, Is There a Limit to Corporate Religious Freedom?

§2254(d)(1) (authorizing habeas relief from a state-court decision that “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”). This concession effectively dispatches any argument that the term “person” as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held corporations involved in these cases. No known understanding of the term “person” includes some but not all corporations. The term “person” sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.20 Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.

Securities disclosure over Cambridge Analytica data breach comes before court

(2) HHS and the dissent make several unpersuasive arguments. Imagine, for example, that you’re a wedding singer and you’re being asked to bless the union through your music and you oppose gay marriage. That, however, is an assertion of probability, not a citation of case law or legislation.

• Whether choosing the corporate form is a burden on the rights of business people’s rights cannot be determined in a vacuum.
• §§2000bb–1(a), (b).
• ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6) (“We have no doubt that ‘person,’ in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear”).
• The 1993 law, called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), states government « shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion » unless that burden is the « least restrictive means » to further a « compelling governmental interest. »

Private vs. Public Ownership

In separate actions, they sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies (collectively HHS) under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, seeking to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health coverage for the four objectionable contraceptives. In No. 13–356, the District Court denied the Hahns and their company—Conestoga Wood Specialties—a preliminary injunction. Affirming, the Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious exercise” under RFRA or the First Amendment, and that the mandate imposed no requirements on the Hahns in their personal capacity. In No. 13–354, the Greens, their children, and their companies—Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel—were also denied a preliminary injunction, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. 37  In a related argument, HHS appears to maintain that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a RFRA claim that seeks an exemption from a legal obligation requiring the plaintiff to confer benefits on third parties. Nothing in the text of RFRA or its basic purposes supports giving the Government an entirely free hand to impose burdens on religious exercise so long as those burdens confer a benefit on other individuals.

The Verdict: Not Going Out of Business

§553, but those claims are not before us. (1) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA. Hobby Lobby is not a secular, publicly traded company. Rather, it is the personal, purpose-driven mission of one of the most devout families I’ve ever met.

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Shares are not traded publicly on an exchange and, therefore, cannot be purchased by the public. Those who control most of the shares have a significant influence on and control of the company. However, closely held corporation shareholders do not receive the same preferential tax treatment as those of corporations with actively traded stocks. See ante, at 32–34. The Court overlooks, however, that it is not the Government’s obligation to prove that an asserted burden is insubstantial. Instead, it is incumbent upon plaintiffs to demonstrate, in support of a RFRA claim, the substantial- ity of the alleged burden.

Under RFRA, can for-profit corporations express religious beliefs like individuals can?

35  The principal dissent makes no effort to reconcile its view about the substantial-burden requirement with our decision in Thomas. 28  To qualify for RFRA’s protection, an asserted belief must be “sincere”; a corporation’s pretextual assertion of a religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail. Cf., e.g., United States v. Quaintance, 608 F. 3d 717, 718–719 (CA ). 20  Not only does the Government concede that the term “persons” in RFRA includes nonprofit corporations, it goes further and appears to concede that the term might also encompass other artificial entities, namely, general partnerships and unincorporated associations.

Using the IRS’s definition, a closely held corporation is a non-personal service corporation that has 50% of its outstanding stock owned by up to 5 individuals at any point in the last six months of a tax year. 13  The Court regards Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U. 617 (1961), as “suggest[ing] . That for-profit corporations possess [free-exercise] rights.” Ante, at 26–27.

§2000bb–2(4) (2000 ed.) (incorporating §2000cc–5), and neither HHS nor the principal dissent can explain why Congress did this if it wanted to tie RFRA coverage tightly to the specific holdings of our pre-Smith free-exercise cases. Moreover, as discussed, the amendment went further, providing that the exercise of religion “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this is hobby lobby publicly traded chapter and the Constitution.” §2000cc–3(g). It is simply not possible to read these provisions as restricting the concept of the “exercise of religion” to those practices specifically addressed in our pre-Smith decisions. §§2000bb–1(a), (b) (emphasis added). The first question that we must address is whether this provision applies to regulations that govern the activities of for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel.

22  It is revealing that the principal dissent cannot even bring itself to acknowledge that Braunfeld was correct in entertaining the merchants’ claims. See post, at 19 (dismissing the relevance of Braunfeld in part because “[t]he free exercise claim asserted there was promptly rejected on the merits”). 13  The Hahns and Conestoga also claimed that the contraceptive mandate violates the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.